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ABSTRACT 
 
Research on political support around the world has demonstrated massive support for democracy 
as the underlying principle of governance. At the same time many citizens express dissatisfaction 
with the way democracy works in practice. People who believe in the principles of democracy, 
while at the same time expressing discontent with the performance of the political system are often 
referred to as critical citizens, or dissatisfied democrats. However, the phenomenon of dissatisfied 
democrats has not received as much empirical attention as it has been discussed theoretically. This 
paper sets out to empirically investigate and explain the gap between the strong support for demo-
cratic principles and the weaker support for the actual functioning of democratic governance, 
which could be seen as democratic deficit both on the micro- and the micro-level, with a focus on 
new and old democracies since different types of democracies face different problems and chal-
lenges. The paper empirically tests two contrasting explanatory perspectives. The first argues that 
the reasons for the democratic deficit are to be found on the input side of the political system, and 
that the solution lies in improving the representative institutions in contemporary democracies. The 
contrasting argument states that the sources of political support and legitimacy are to be found at 
the output side of the political system, where the quality of government in terms of non-corrupt 
and impartial institutions play the pivotal role. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that 
both explanations are relevant, but factors relating to the input side of democracy seem to be of 
somewhat greater importance for the likelihood of being a dissatisfied democrat, and that this is 
particularly the case in established democracies.  
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The contemporary state of democracy in the world could be regarded as somewhat paradoxical. On 
the one hand, the last decades has seen a veritable growth in the number of electoral democracies 
all over the globe. Electoral democracy has more or less become the only legitimate means to gain 
political power, and surveys from all parts of the world show that democracy as a political regime is 
endorsed by large majorities of citizens in most societies, democratic as well as authoritarian (cf. 
Dalton et al. 2007; Inglehart 2003). At the same time, however, we are often approached by reports 
and academic studies – sometimes of the alarming sort – describing different types of challenges 
facing democratic political systems.  
First, on the macro-level, it seems like the last decades’ global growth of democracies has come to a 
halt, or even changed into reversal. Many new democracies display severe problems with respect to 
political rights and civil liberties, corruption, abuse of power and manipulation of electoral process-
es. In many places, the result has been democratic reversals and transitions to hybrid regimes, 
where formal democratic institutions are combined with authoritarian practices and an uneven 
political playing field tilted in favour of incumbents (cf. Levitsky & Way 2010; Schedler 2006; Pud-
dington 2013).  
Simultaneously, an increasing number of studies have testified to widespread public discontent with 
the performance of democratic political systems around the world. Fundamental democratic institu-
tions such as political parties and governments face decreasing levels of public trust and traditional 
forms of political participation, not least in established Western democracies. Some observers argue 
that the most pressing challenge to contemporary democracies comes from its own citizens: 
Contemporary democracies are facing a challenge today. This challenge does not come from ene-
mies within or outside the nation. Instead, the challenge comes from democracy’s own citizens, 
who have grown distrustful of politicians, sceptical about democratic institutions, and disillusioned 
about how the democratic process functions (Dalton 2004, 1). 
However, scholars disagree about the potential danger of political discontent among citizens and 
electorates. Survey evidence points toward a somewhat contradictory situation. Although large 
shares of people around the world express discontent with the performance of democracy in their 
country, they simultaneously express strong support for the principles of democracy. In the litera-
ture, people harbouring these attitudes have been labelled ‘dissatisfied democrats’ or ‘critical citi-
zens’, i.e. individuals who support the principles of democracy but at the same time are dissatisfied 
with the performance of the existing political system (cf. Norris 1999; Doorenspleet 2012; Qi and 
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Shin 2011). Although research on political support is nothing short of voluminous, surprisingly 
little empirical work has been devoted to the issue of dissatisfied democrats, and the factors that 
may explain why large shares of citizens who embrace the principles of democracy express discon-
tent with the functioning of the political system, even in countries with long records of democratic 
stability and positive economic development (cf. Dalton 1999; Klingemann 1999; Holmberg 1999; 
Pharr & Putnam 2000).  
This paper sets out to investigate the gap between the strong support for democratic principles and 
the weaker support for the actual functioning of democratic governance, which could be seen as a 
form of a democratic deficit (Norris 2011). In this effort, we focus on two contrasting theoretical 
perspectives. The first perspective argues that the reasons for the democratic deficit are to be found 
on the input side of the political system, and that the solution lies in improving the representative 
institutions in contemporary democracies. The contrasting argument states that the sources of po-
litical support and legitimacy are to be found at the output side of the political system, where the 
quality of government in terms of non-corrupt and impartial institutions play the pivotal role. We 
also introduce the hypothesis that support may be subject to different challenges in different types 
of countries, and that the factors explaining political support and discontent in established democ-
racies may be different from those that explain support and discontent in more recently democra-
tised countries. We believe that institutional consolidation is an important mechanism in the pro-
cess of generating political support. In the empirical analysis we test these contrasting theories by 
multilevel regression analysis, using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).  
The paper is structured in the following way. We start out with a discussion of the concept of ‘dis-
satisfied democrats’ and how it is operationalized in our analyses. In the second section we discuss 
earlier research on the issue of dissatisfied democrats and present two theories that propose differ-
ent explanations of support for the performance of the regime. In the third part, we present de-
scriptive and multivariate analyses of dissatisfied democrats in old and new democracies. The paper 
ends with the concluding remarks. 
Dissatisfied democrats: A resource or threat to democracy? 
The concept of dissatisfied democrats draws on a multidimensional understanding of the concept 
of political support (cf. Easton 1975; Norris 1999; 2011; Dalton 2004; Linde & Ekman 2003; 
Klingemann 1999). In many studies it has been shown that citizens express strong support for the 
principles of democracy while at the same time being discontent with the way the democratic sys-
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tem works in practice (cf. Lagos 2003a; 2003b; Norris 2011; Klingemann 1999; Rose et al. 1998). 
Hence, when studying political support it is important to acknowledge the theoretical and empirical 
distinction between popular support for the principles of the regime and support for the performance 
of the regime.  
Support for the principles of the democratic regime concerns beliefs in fundamental democratic 
values and principles, such as the importance of having a democratic political system with free and 
fair elections and a firm rejection of non-democratic regime alternatives. The regime performance 
dimension concerns citizens’ perceptions of the workings of the democratic regime, such as satis-
faction with the actual performance of the political system (Norris 2011; 1999; Booth & Seligson 
2009; Linde & Ekman 2003). The multidimensional nature of support thus makes it perfectly pos-
sible for an individual to be convinced that democracy constitutes the best – or least worst – system 
of government for his or her country, but at the same time feel discontent with the way the demo-
cratic system works in practice. These are the type of citizens that in the literature have been la-
belled ‘critical citizens’, ‘critical democrats’ or ‘dissatisfied democrats’ and that make up the empiri-
cal phenomenon we set out to investigate. Since we aim to investigate the factors that make indi-
viduals with democratic orientations dissatisfied or satisfied with the way democracy works, in the 
empirical analysis ‘dissatisfied democrats’ are compared with ‘satisfied democrats’. 
For quite some time it has been debated how these two types of democrats contribute to the legit-
imacy and stability of democratic regimes. In Critical Citizens, Pippa Norris and collaborators drew 
attention to the discrepancy between citizens’ strong support for democracy in principle and exten-
sive discontent with the performance of democratic regimes (Norris 1999). The relatively high fre-
quency of dissatisfied democrats found in different parts of the world was generally interpreted in 
positive terms. For example, in his global analysis of political support, Klingemann argued that: 
The fact of dissatisfaction does not imply danger to the persistence or further-
ance of democracy. A significant number of people spread around the world can 
be labelled ‘dissatisfied democrats’ /…/ The dissatisfied democrats can be 
viewed as less a threat to, than a force for, reform and improvement of demo-
cratic processes and structures … (Klingemann 1999: 32).  
Dissatisfied democrats were – and have often been since – perceived as being ‘critical’ because they 
were assumed to be highly educated, well-informed, politically interested and active, and could thus 
constitute a potential driving force in strengthening democracy. For example, it has been argued 
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that a general commitment to democracy as a system of government is not a sufficient condition 
when it comes to the importance of mass attitudes for democratization, but that critical democrats 
may put important pressure for change on authoritarian leaders that may lead to democratization 
(Qi & Shin 2011). 
Everybody does not embrace this positive view, however. In his acclaimed book Why Politics Mat-
ters, Gerry Stoker argues that the growing scepticism towards political institutions and increasing 
levels of discontent with the functioning of democracy are more than just a reflection of healthy 
scepticism, and thus constitute a real threat to representative democracy (Stoker 2006; cf. 
Doorenspleet 2012). Similar concerns about the dangers of fading public trust in democratic insti-
tutions have been expressed in the field of political support (cf. Dalton 2004; Pharr and Putnam 
2000). However, surprisingly few empirical studies concerned with dissatisfied democrats have been 
published. Are they really better informed and more interested in political matters and more likely 
to participate in political activities than satisfied democrats?  
Explanations of dissatisfied democrats 
There is an abundance of empirical analyses of the determinants of satisfaction with democracy in 
general. Usually, the focus has been either on individual-level determinants or the political context, 
with an emphasis on formal political institutions (cf. Bernauer & Vatter 2012; Aarts & Thomassen 
2008; Anderson & Guillory 1997). However, the studies that have investigated the particular issue 
of dissatisfied democrats in a systematic way are few, and also quite limited when it comes to geo-
graphical scope.  
In a recent study covering eight African democracies, Doorenspleet (2012) empirically investigates 
the micro-level determinants of ‘dissatisfied’ and ‘satisfied democrats’. The results show that the 
positive notion of dissatisfied democrats as an asset to democracy that has often been put forth in 
the literature should be interpreted with a certain amount of caution, to say the least. Compared to 
citizens with non-democratic regime preferences, dissatisfied democrats do indeed display higher 
levels of education, a more critical stance and are better informed in political matters, and should 
therefore be more prone to question the actions and authority of politicians. However, compared 
to the satisfied democrats dissatisfied democrats show lower levels of political participation and they 
also come out as less politically interested, which speaks against the hypothesis that dissatisfied 
democrats are the ones most likely to be active and organized, fighting for political change and a 
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deepening of democracy, and therefore constitute an important democratizing force (cf. Qi & Shin 
2011).  
These are of course interesting and important findings, and a good starting point for further inquir-
ies of the issue of dissatisfied democrats, notwithstanding the narrow geographical focus and the 
strict individual-level analysis. In our study, we take Doorenspleet’s main finding – that political 
disaffection among democrats seems to be a result of discontent with the government performance 
– as a point of departure. However, we set out to broaden the analysis empirically, theoretically and 
methodologically. Apart from testing two competing theoretical claims, a guiding question in our 
analysis is if there are different patterns of democratic dissatisfaction in old democracies with well-
established democratic political institutions compared to more recently democratised countries, 
where new institutional frameworks and party systems are in the process of consolidation.  
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
The first explanatory perspective concerns the input side of the political system, and has to do with 
representation. In this view, people accept a political authority because they have been given the 
right to take part in elections that have resulted in a government that represents the majority of the 
people. Those who are on the losing side will still perceive the system as legitimate because they 
know that they stand a good chance of becoming the majority in the next elections (Rothstein 2009, 
313). In the conclusions of the influential volume Critical Citizens, Pippa Norris argues that one of 
the key solutions to the problem of widespread political discontent could be to improve the institu-
tions of representative democracy because large portions of the electorate feel that their views are 
not represented by the political elites governing them (Norris 1999b). Political support is thus con-
tingent on the quality of representation and participation in the democratic process. Widespread 
public discontent regarding representation contributes to a democratic deficit, which in the long 
run could lead to a loss of legitimacy (Norris 1997; 2011).  
Much research has focused on the impact of institutions on satisfaction with democracy, for exam-
ple electoral systems. Proportional systems are in this respect supposed to be superior in linking 
citizens' vote preferences into parliamentary seats. However, according to the findings by Karp & 
Bowler (2001) and Aarts & Thomassen (2008) the relationship between election system design and 
people’s assessment of how their democracy works, the connection seems to be the inverse, where 
proportional systems are related to somewhat lower levels of satisfaction with democracy. Never-
theless, one can expect an indirect impact of electoral systems on citizens’ satisfaction with the 
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working of democracy since proportional systems are expected to produce multiparty systems. 
Such systems will increase the breadth of alternatives for voters to choose between, something that 
in turn can be expected to affect the levels of satisfaction with democracy (Lijphart 1999).  
Furthermore it has been argued that a broader range of parties leads to greater representation of 
diverse values (Hoffman 2005), minority groups (Lijphart 1999) and women (Norris 2004). Lijphart 
argues that proportional systems are more consensual and that the crucial mechanism is whether a 
system is performing in a consensual versus a conflict manner. This assumption has been further 
elaborated in a recent article by Ezrow and Xezonakis (2011), in which they test whether increases 
in average party policy extremism is related to lower levels of satisfaction with democracy. The 
results indicate that this is the case. The more party system centrism in relation to the median voter 
position, the greater were citizens’ satisfaction with the working of democracy.  
We can thus expect that citizens who perceive their views to be represented by one or more of the 
main parties during elections to also be satisfied with the performance of the democratic system in 
general. However, newer parties are more likely to repeatedly adjust or change their policies and 
ideological profiles. Frequent changes in policies, identity and location may in turn be confusing for 
voters (Brug 2008). We can thus, hypothetically, expect the perceived ideological proximity between 
parties and voters to be greater in older democracies with consolidated and more stable party sys-
tems.  
A competing, more recent, theoretical perspective argues that support and legitimacy are created at 
the output side of the political system (Norris 2012; Gjefsen 2012; Dahlberg & Holmberg 2013). 
The actual performance of political institutions and – most important – a high degree of quality of 
government in terms of impartial implementation of public policy. Hence, universalistic, impartial 
government institutions built on the rule of law is the key to generate public support for the work-
ing of the political system (Rothstein 2009; Rothstein 2011; cf. Wagner et al. 2009; Linde 2012; 
Holmberg & Rothstein 2012). Compared to established democracies, newly democratised countries 
often display poor records of government performance, particularly when it comes to different 
aspects of the quality of government. One – if not the most – important aspects of quality of gov-
ernment is the absence of corruption (Rothstein 2011; Rothstein & Teorell 2008; Adserá et al. 
2003). Thus, in line with recent research on the strong relationship between citizens’ evaluations of 
the extent of corruption and political support (cf. Linde 2012; Linde & Erlingsson 2012; Booth & 
Seligson 2009; Seligson 2002) we hypothesise that public perceptions of the extent of corruption in 
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the political system will have a significant effect on the likelihood of being satisfied or dissatisfied 
with the way democracy works. Citizens who regard corruption to be widespread will thus be more 
likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works, although they see democracy as the best way 
of government (cf. Holmberg 2011).  
Earlier research on dissatisfied democrats has focused on both new and old democracies, but not in 
a systematically comparative manner. Different types of democracies face different problems and 
challenges. One of the most important factors in this regard is the degree of institutional consolida-
tion. In countries that have recently gone through a transition from authoritarian rule the constitu-
tional and institutional frameworks may be fragile, and often a fair share of the political game con-
cerns the actual rules of the game. In consolidated democracies, the political game is played within a 
more or less fixed institutional framework where all major actors – and the public – agree on the 
basic rules of the game (cf. Linz & Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999). Moreover, established and new 
democracies often differ in terms of political cleavage structures and the extent of programmatic 
appeal of political parties (cf. Kitschelt 1995; Whitefield 2002). There are also reasons to believe 
that people’s general expectations about politics are different in old and new democracies, for ex-
ample when it comes to issues of regime performance and the extent of political corruption. Thus, 
we hypothesize that the factors explaining democratic discontent may be different in established 
and new democracies. In the multivariate analysis we investigate this by interacting the main ex-
planatory variables with type of democracy (old or new). 
Data 
The analyses are based on data from the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems’ 
(CSES), which were collected in 2001-2006 in post-election surveys (see www.cses.org).1 Since we 
are studying citizens’ satisfaction with the working of democracy, we are for obvious reasons re-
stricted to countries that are democracies. We have therefore excluded countries that were not clas-
sified as “free” according to the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties at the time 
when data was collected.2 Furthermore, it has been argued that a separation between presidential 
elections and parliamentary elections should be preferred since government formation processes in 
presidential elections are quite distinct from those in parliamentary systems (Clark, Golder & Gold-
                                                     
1
 The data can be received from CSES Secretariat, www.cses.org, Centre for Political Studies. Institute for Social 
Research. The University of Michigan. The data can also be downloaded from: www.umich.edu/~cses. 
2
 Freedom House. Selected data from Freedom House’s annual global survey of political rights and civil liberties. 
www.freedomhouse.org. 
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er 2009). For this reason we are focusing on countries with parliamentary elections. This leaves us 
with 34 countries in total. The countries that are included are depicted in figure 1. Due to missing 
data on independent variables the number of countries in the multivariate analysis is restricted to 
24. 
The dependent variable: Dissatisfied democrats 
Our dependent variable is a dichotomous division between dissatisfied and satisfied democrats. It is 
based on two different variables that can be regarded as standard items in operationalizations of 
public support for regime principles and regime performance. The first item measures respondents’ 
support for democratic regime principles and reads: ‘Please tell me how strongly you agree or disa-
gree with the following statement: Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other 
form of government. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with this state-
ment?’ Respondents answering ‘agree strongly’ and ‘agree’ are classified as ‘democrats’. In order to 
sort out dissatisfied and satisfied democrats, we use the frequently used ‘satisfaction with democra-
cy’ (SWD) item, which reads: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satis-
fied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?’ Here, respondents being 
‘very’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ are regarded as ‘satisfied’ democrats, while those responding ‘not very’ 
and ‘not at all satisfied’ are classified as ‘dissatisfied’ democrats. While being probably the most 
frequently used indicator of support for regime performance, the meaning and measurement of the 
SWD item has been debated. Here we side with those that have argued, and shown, that it is a suit-
able indicator of public evaluations of the performance of the political system in general (Linde & 
Ekman 2003; Anderson 2002; Fuchs et al. 1995; Norris 2011). The operationalization of the de-
pendent variable is presented in Table 1.  
TABLE 1, (OPERATIONALIZATION OF ‘DISSATISFIED’ AND ‘SATISFIED’ DEMOCRATS) 
 
  Regime principles: Support for democracy as the best system of government 
   High  Low 
Regime performance: 
Satisfaction with democra-
cy 
High Satisfied democrats (coded 0) Satisfied non-democrats (not included in 
the analyses) 
Low Dissatisfied democrats (coded 1) Dissatisfied non-democrats (not included in 
the analyses) 
 
Our main interest in this study is directed towards those individuals whose orientations fit in the 
lower left cell in the table. Dissatisfied democrats are those who express support for democracy as 
the best way to govern the country but are dissatisfied with the performance of the democratic 
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system. However, since we aim to investigate the factors that make individuals with democratic 
orientations dissatisfied or satisfied with the way democracy works, the satisfied democrats are also 
of great importance in our empirical analysis.  
Dissatisfied democrats in new and old democracies 
Political discontent and dissatisfied democrats have been observed in different political settings. 
Most often the discussion has been focusing on established Western democracies, although empiri-
cal studies have testified to substantial portions of dissatisfied democrats in other geographical and 
political settings, such as South-Saharan Africa (Doorenspleet 2012), Asia (Lagos 2003a), post-
communist Europe (Lagos 2003a; Linde & Ekman 2003; Catterberg 2003), Latin America (Lagos 
2003b; Catterberg 2003) and transitional countries (Qi & Shin 2011).  
Figure 1 shows the aggregated shares of dissatisfied democrats in the democracies included in the 
CSES dataset. In order to examine if the phenomenon of dissatisfied democrats is predominantly 
found in newer democracies, as suggested by earlier research, we distinguish between old and new 
democracies. Countries that have democratized after 1980 are classified as new democracies and the 
rest as old democracies.3 The data presented in Figure 1 clearly indicate that the existence of dissat-
isfied democrats cannot be considered a ‘Western’ phenomenon. In fact, dissatisfaction among 
democrats is more common in newer democracies. The average of dissatisfied democrats in new 
democracies is 55 per cent, compared to 29 per cent in older democracies. There is substantial vari-
ation within both groups of countries. Among new democracies the shares range from a low 33 per 
cent in Chile to quite remarkable 75 per cent in South Korea. In old democracies we find a small 
share of only 6 per cent in Denmark to 61 per cent in Israel. Israel and Italy are the only older de-
mocracies where dissatisfied democrats constitute an absolute majority of the public. Among the 
newer democracies, however, this is the case in nine out of fourteen countries.  
 
 
                                                     
3
 The question of where to draw the line between old and new democracies is of course a subjective matter. Here we 
regard countries going through a transition from authoritarian rule during the ‘third wave of democratization’ (Huntington 
1991) as new democracies. However, we place Portugal and Spain in the group of old democracies. They have been 
democracies for almost 40 years and have been members of the European Union since 1986. This distinction is also 
used by Aarts & Thomassen (2008) in their analysis of institutional determinants of satisfaction with democracies, draw-
ing on the module 2 of the CSES data set. Also see Norris (2010), in which Spain is classified as an older liberal democ-
racy.  
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FIGURE 1: SHARES OF DISSATISFIED DEMOCRATS IN NEW AND OLD DEMOCRACIES (PER CENT) 
 
Source: CSES Module 2. 
Note: Bars represent share of respondents in a country endorsing democracy as the best way to govern country and at the same 
time being dissatisfied with the way democracy works. Thus, the base consists only of those agreeing that democracy is the best way 
of government. 
 
Thus, the data at hand show that quite substantial portions of citizens in both old and new democ-
racies can be labelled dissatisfied democrats, i.e. viewing democracy as the best way to govern socie-
ty while at the same time feeling discontent with the way democracy works in practice. We can also 
observe that the existence of dissatisfied democrats is more frequent in countries with shorter expe-
rience of democratic institutions.  
Who are the dissatisfied democrats and what drives them? 
After having mapped out the cross-country variation, we will now move on to an issue that has 
often been discussed in the literature, but seldom empirically investigated. Who are the dissatisfied 
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democrats? Are they really more politically sophisticated and ‘critical’ than their fellow citizens that 
could be labelled ‘satisfied democrats’? In one of the few empirical analyses made, Doorenspleet 
found that in African democracies, ‘satisfied democrats are generally more likely to vote and have a 
higher level of political interest than dissatisfied democrats, who are less involved and less active’ 
(2012, 290). Thus, Doorenspleet did not find any evidence for the often made claim that dissatis-
fied democrats are more inclined to be politically active, struggling to improve the quality of the 
democratic political system. However, in a comparative analysis covering four Latin American and 
five East European countries, Catterberg (2003) found that people combining post-materialist and 
democratic orientations with weak support for the government were significantly more likely to 
take political action.  
In the following, we set out to further explore this issue using data from a larger number of coun-
tries displaying substantial variation in terms of level of democracy and experience with democratic 
institutions. Table 2 compares different individual-level characteristics between dissatisfied and 
satisfied democrats in new and old democracies. Starting with some standard socio-demographic 
variables, we see that there are no major differences when it comes to gender. Looking at age, it is 
interesting to note that in the oldest cohort (70+) a minority of the respondents in new democra-
cies are dissatisfied democrats, while in all other age groups dissatisfied democrats are in majority. 
In old democracies there are only small age differences and dissatisfied democrats are less than an 
one third minority in all age groups.  
Education has often been hypothesised to impact political support in the sense that higher educat-
ed citizens hold a more critical stance towards authority. It is thus interesting to note that in our 
sample we find that in new democracies those with only elementary education are less likely to be 
dissatisfied democrats, while people with higher education tend to be more dissatisfied. In older 
democracies, however, the opposite pattern is visible. Here, people with low education are the ones 
most likely to be dissatisfied democrats.  In both old and new democracies, unemployment seems 
to cause discontent, although in old democracies a majority of unemployed respondents are still 
satisfied with the way democracy works.  
It is obvious from the results in Table 2 that the relationships between the socio-demographic vari-
ables and whether citizens tend to be dissatisfied or satisfied democrats are very limited. And that 
goes for people in old as well as in new democracies. People’s gender, age and income do not mat-
ter much for the probability of them being dissatisfied or satisfied democrats. Employment status 
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and level of education matter somewhat more, but not much more. The percentage difference in 
the tendency to be a dissatisfied democrat between employed and unemployed or between high and 
low educated citizens is only around 7-9 percentage points. 
The relationship between being a dissatisfied democrat and some political variables like electoral 
participation, party identification and political knowledge is also of a limited scope. The relevant 
percentage differences are only between 2-7 percentage points. However, the correlations are of an 
expected direction, at least when it comes to participation and identification. Voters tend to be less 
dissatisfied democrats than non-voters and party identified persons are as well less dissatisfied 
democrats compared to people without a party identification. As to political knowledge, there is no 
relationship between degrees of political knowledge and the probability to become a dissatisfied 
democrat. In old and in new democracies, level of political information is not related to whether 
citizens turn into dissatisfied democrats or not.  
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TABLE 2, (WHO ARE THE DISSATISFIED AND SATISFIED DEMOCRATS? 
    New Democracies  Old Democracies  
  
Dissatisfied (%) Dissatisfied (%) 
Total 
 
55 29 
Gender Men 54 28 
 
Women  56 29 
    
Age 16-21 56 27 
 
22-30 56 30 
 
31-40 54 28 
 
41-50 56 29 
 
51-60 54 29 
 
61-70 54 29 
 
>70 48 27 
Education Elementary school 46 35 
 
High school 56 31 
 
Upper Secondary 55 28 
 
University 54 28 
Employment status Unemployed 62 39 
 
Employed 54 30 
Household Income 1-2 quintile 53 30 
 
3< quintile 55 26 
Party Identification No 58 32 
 
Yes 52 25 
Political Participation Voted 54 28 
 
Did not Vote 59 35 
Political information Low 54 31 
 
High 56 28 
Assessment of Government 
Performance Bad 71 48 
 
Good 37 16 
Assessment of Corruption Widespread 58 38 
 
Not-Widespread 40 18 
Assessment of Subjective 
Representation Bad 63 43 
  Good 43 18 
Source: CSES module 2. 
What seems to matters substantially though is how citizens judge the quality of the input as well as 
the output side of the democratic system. Evaluations of the performance of the government over 
the past years are strongly related to satisfaction with the way democracy works. In new democra-
 16 
cies, no less than 63 per cent of those expressing a positive view of government performance are 
satisfied democrats. The corresponding figure in old democracies is 84 per cent. The relationship 
between people’s assessments of the performance of their government, levels of corruption and 
degrees of subjective feelings of being represented are in general strongly correlated with peoples 
tendency to become dissatisfied democrats. The theoretically relevant percentage differences are in 
the order of between 18 and 33 percentage points. Clearly, citizens’ evaluations of government 
performance, extent of corruption and degree of representation condition the likelihood to become 
dissatisfied democrats. In the subsequent section we test the impact of the competing explanations 
described above more substantially in a series of multi-level logistic regressions. 
Explaining dissatisfied democrats in old and new democracies 
We investigate the determinants of democratic dissatisfaction by a series of multi-level logistic re-
gression models. In order to test our hypotheses concerning input and output related political sup-
port we use three individual-levels variables. The ‘quality of government’ argument is tested with 
two questions concerning corruption and government performance. The first question taps re-
spondents’ perceptions about the level of political corruption in their country. It reads: ‘How wide-
spread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]: very wide-
spread, quite widespread, not very widespread, it hardly happens at all?’ The item used as our indi-
cator of perceived government performance reads: ‘Now thinking about the performance of the 
government in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government has done over the past 
years. Has it done a very good job, a good job, a bad job, a very bad job?' The explanatory power of 
the ‘representation argument’ is tested using a question measuring the degree to which the respond-
ent thinks that the electorates’ views are being represented in the political system: ‘Considering how 
elections in [country] usually work in your view, to what extent do elections result in members of 
parliament having views mirroring what voters want: very well, quite well, not very well, or not well 
at all?’. In order to investigate if there are any significant differences in effects between established 
and newer democracies, we construct a dichotomous variable coded 1 for new democracies and 2 
for old democracies. The analyses also include a number of individual-level and system-level con-
trol variables. Exact wording and coding of these are presented in Appendix 1.  
The analyses presented in Table 3 starts by unveiling the impact of a number of variables that in 
earlier research have been showed to affect political support. The results in Model 1 are in line with 
what could be expected from the descriptive analysis in Table 2 and earlier research on system sup-
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port. When it comes to our control variables, people that are employed, identify with a political 
party and are more politically knowledgeable are less dissatisfied on average. In line with a growing 
body of recent research we also find that people who voted for a party that ended up in a govern-
ment position express significantly less dissatisfaction than those who were on the ‘losing’ side (cf. 
Anderson & Guillory 1997; Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Blais & Gélineau 2007; Linde & Ekman 
2003). Voting as such, however, does not affect dissatisfaction. 
Model 1 also includes the three variables that are central to our theoretical point of departure: the 
extent of corruption, government performance and subjective representation. As pointed out by 
earlier research, democratic discontent (here, the likelihood of being a dissatisfied democrat) is to a 
large extent driven by negative perceptions of government performance (Doreenspleet 2012). 
When the governments’ performance is perceived to be good, citizens tend to be more satisfied 
with the democratic system. All three variables are important but government performance has by 
far the largest effect on democratic dissatisfaction, under control for the impact of the other varia-
bles included in the model, followed by perceptions of the extent to which the electorate views are 
represented in the political system. As expected we also find a statistically significant effect of pub-
lic perceptions of the extent of political corruption. Individuals that do view problems of corrup-
tion to be widespread also tend to be dissatisfied democrats. The fact that perceptions of govern-
ment performance has a relatively strong impact on dissatisfaction is not surprising since perfor-
mance and dissatisfaction with the democratic system are two closely related concepts. When ask-
ing about satisfaction with the way democracy works, the government’s performance could very 
well be regarded as part of the concept. Nevertheless, the exclusion of this variable does not affect 
the relative impact of the two other measures relevant to the input and the output side of the politi-
cal system. In general, the analysis shows that citizens’ perceptions of different aspects of political 
performance are of greater importance for understanding democratic discontent rather than an 
individual's employment status or party identification. This is however a rather obvious result given 
that the different perceptions must be judged to be causally closer to our dependent variable than 
the socio-demographic or party political variables.  
Model 2 looks at the importance of two system level factors together with a variable for institution-
al maturity. In order to assess the impact of our democratic input and governmental output factors 
in a more 'objective' manner, we include two global measures of institutional impartiality and ideo-
logical congruence.  In order to assess the level of quality of government we use a new index of 
government impartiality, which measures to what extent government institutions exercise their 
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power impartially. The index is constructed from five expert survey items tapping the presence of 
the impartiality norm. Higher values indicate a more impartial public administration (for more de-
tailed information, see Dahlström et al. 2011 and Teorell et al. 2011).4 The ‘ideological congruence’ 
measure is based on the absolute distances between voters self-placement on an eleven point left-
right scale and the median placement of the party voted for, made by the approximately 40 per cent 
most educated respondents in each country. The reason for using the placement of parties made by 
respondents with higher education is that people with lower levels of education tend to make less 
qualified party placements in that they tend to place parties they are unfamiliar with in the middle 
of the left-right scale (see Alvarez & Nagler 2004). The analysis presented in Model 2 shows that 
high country-levels of quality of government are associated with less democratic dissatisfaction on 
the individual level, while the effect of ideological congruence is in the expected direction, but does 
not reach statistical significance. And, interestingly, democratic discontent is not significantly differ-
ent in old and new democracies when controlling for quality of government.  
In Model 3 we re-introduce the individual level variables together with the system level variables. 
Together, the individual level variables clearly show the greatest explanatory potential.5 The signifi-
cant effect of quality of government disappears, leaving the strongest effects to perceptions of gov-
ernment effectiveness, subjective representation and corruption.  
                                                     
4
 The QoG-impartiality measure is highly correlated with Transparency International's corruption perception index (r: 
.90).  
5
 The impact of the system related variables are, however, not unessential since their inclusion in model 2 contributes to 
a significant decrease in the intercept standard deviations between countries, from .744 in an empty base-model  (dis-
playing the intercept standard deviations in the dependent variable alone) compared to .454 in model 2; while the indi-
vidual variables alone in model 1 simply contributes with a drop from .744 to .520. 
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TABLE 3, (DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRATIC DISSATISFACTION ‘LOGISTIC MULTI-LEVEL RE-
GRESSION’) 
  Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 3 Mod. 4 Mod. 5  Mod. 6 Mod. 7 Mod. 8 Mod. 9 
Individual level variables 
         Age 0.112* 
 
0.117* 0.114* 0.114* 0.106* 0.108* 0.111* 0.116* 
Sex 0.032 
 
0.032 0.029 0.033 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.037 
Education -0.075 
 
-0.066 -0.060 -0.070 -0.065 -0.057 -0.054 -0.050 
Employment -0.316*** 
 
-0.314*** -0.309*** -0.314*** -0.317*** -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.309*** 
Party identification -0.162*** 
 
-0.163*** -0.166*** -0.162*** -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.163*** 
Political knowledge -0.227*** 
 
-0.230*** -0.213*** -0.229*** -0.233*** -0.220*** -0.221*** -0.220*** 
Voted for govern. party -0.303*** 
 
-0.298*** -0.297*** -0.305*** -0.294*** -0.302*** -0.300*** -0.307*** 
Voted  0.008 
 
0.009 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.010 
          Corruption  -1.018*** 
 
-1.001*** -0.034 -1.008*** -0.995*** -0.174 -0.178 -0.162 
Government perfor-
mance -2.375*** 
 
-2.375*** -2.377*** -2.792*** -2.355*** -2.995*** -3.011*** -3.033*** 
Subjective representat-
ion -1.648*** 
 
-1.651*** -1.644*** -1.654*** 0.273 0.235 0.236 0.231 
System level variables 
         QoG-impartiality 
 
-1.539*** -0.578 
    
-0.597 0.170 
Ideological congruence 
 
-1.157 -1.006 
    
-1.039 -0.009 
New-old democracies 
 
-0.122 -0.282 -0.558*** -0.822*** -0.151 -0.214 0.218 -0.110 
Interactions 
         Corruption*new/old 
   
-0.574*** 
  
-0.486*** -0.480*** -0.490*** 
Government per-
for.*new/old 
    
0.247 
 
0.383** 0.393*** 0.409*** 
Voters' views 
repr*new/old 
     
-1.194*** -1.172*** -1.174*** -1.169*** 
Controls 
         Gd/pc(log) 
        
-0.150*** 
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Gd-growth/pc(log) 
        
-1.104** 
Constant 2.269*** 1.449** 3.856*** 3.195*** 3.636*** 2.533*** 2.643*** 3.083*** 3.020*** 
Var. Lev 2 -1.314*** -1.586*** -1.976*** -1.855*** -1.822*** -1.795*** -1.800*** -1.948*** -2.592*** 
Std. Dev. Lev 2 0,518 0,452 0,372 0,395 0,402 0,407 0,407 0,378 0,274 
Rho 0,076 0,058 0,04 0,045 0,047 0,048 0,048 0,042 0,022 
Observations 22,917 22,917 22,917 22,917 22,917 22,917 22,917 22,917 22,917 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Comment: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data come from the CSES module 2, collected between 2001-2006. Level 2 in 
the random part refers to the country units and level 1 to individuals. The data is unweighted since the only weights that should 
be included in a multi-level model is weights for unequal selection probabilities within countries (see Asparouhov and Muthen 
2004). All independent variables are rescaled, stretching from 0-1, showing the total effects on the dependent variable. ‘  
Sources: CSES module 2; The Quality of Government Dataset. 
 
In general, subjective representation is somewhat more important than assessments of political 
corruption when explaining citizens' dissatisfaction with the democratic system, while the current 
state of corruption or ideological representation on a system level is of minor importance per se.6  
The question is then to what extent the effect of these factors are related to democratic and institu-
tional maturity. In Models 4 to 6 we include interaction terms between perceived corruption, gov-
ernment performance and assessments of subjective representation in new and old democracies.  
What we find in model 4 is that the effect of perceived corruption has an additional impact on 
dissatisfaction among citizens in older democracies (-.574***). Hence, in older democracies with 
more established political institutions corruption has a stronger impact on the probabilities of turn-
ing from a satisfied to a dissatisfied democrat.  
It is an effect of the fact that expectations of non-corrupt behavior are more pronounced in old 
democracies, where the problems of corruption and abuse of power are not as acute as in newly 
                                                     
6
 The effects in terms of absolute levels should, however, not be overstated since the relationships may suffer from 
endogeneity. As earlier mentioned, the causal order of subjective representation, government performance and percep-
tions of corruption on citizens’ dissatisfaction with the working of democracy is theoretically not entirely straightforward. 
This implies that depending on the strength of any presumed backward causality, this will lead to an overestimation of 
the effect of the independent variables. This problem can easily be overcome by using panel data. Unfortunately we are 
here stuck with cross-sectional data since, to our knowledge, no country comparative panel data is available for these 
specific variables. However, in terms of comparing differences between newer and older democracies, the endogeneity 
problem is less severe since the interaction effects are less sensitive in this respect. More critical though is the compari-
son of variables in terms of absolute effect.   
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democratized countries. Model 5 reveals another interesting finding. While government perfor-
mance alone is the factor that by far has the greatest negative impact on democratic discontent, the 
effect is equally strong in new as well as in older democracies (.247). Thus, institutional maturity 
does not seem to moderate the impact of general performance on citizens’ dissatisfaction with de-
mocracy. In the sixth model, we interact perceptions of subjective representation with new versus 
old democracies. The results indicate an even stronger moderating effect compared to the effect of 
corruption perceptions in new and old democracies, with an additional effect of subjective repre-
sentation in older democracies by means of (–1.194***). An interpretation of this effect is that 
there are greater expectations in terms of performance, both on the input as well as on the output 
side of the democratic system in older more established democracies.  
In order to more clearly illustrate the differences in the effect of perceived presence of corruption 
and subjective representation on public dissatisfaction as a function of democratic consolidation, 
figure 2 illustrates the marginal effects separately in newer and older political systems (based on 
model 4 and 6).  
FIGURE 2, (MARGINAL EFFECT OF PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION AND SUBJECTIVE REPRE-
SENTATION ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT AMONG CITIZENS IN NEW AND OLD DEMOCRATIES 
  
As already could be seen in table 3, perceptions of government performance was by far the strong-
est single predictor behind citizens’ dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. However, its 
effect was equally strong among citizens in both new as well as in older democratic states. Regard-
ing the effect of our input- and output factors, the effects are significantly different among citizens 
in newer and older democracies. The effect of corruption assessments and subjective representation 
is much stronger among citizens in older democracies, which support our initial idea that citizens in 
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older democracies should have greater expectations when it comes to democratic representation 
and absence of political corruption.  
The interaction effects are also robust under control for each other and for the system level varia-
bles, although the interaction term ‘government performance*new/old’ only reaches significance at 
the 90 per cent level (Models 7 and 8). In the final model (9), we introduce two additional system 
level control variables; the log of GDP per capita and the log of GDP growth per capita, but the 
initial results are unaffected.  
Representation and performance 
Contemporary democracies exhibit substantial shares of people declaring allegiance to democracy 
as a way to organise society, while at the same time expressing discontent with the performance of 
the democratic political system. Research on system support and political legitimacy has for quite 
some time discussed the implications of the occurrence of such dissatisfied democrats, but the 
causes (and effects) of the phenomenon have only rarely been investigated empirically. This paper 
therefore sets out to empirically investigate the issue of dissatisfied democrats empirically in a com-
parative perspective, using data from a broad range of democratic countries.  
The most obvious finding is that dissatisfied democrats are not a ‘Western’ phenomenon. Dissatis-
fied democrats are in fact more frequent in newer democracies and there is a substantial degree of 
variation within both groups of countries. In the literature, the debate has to a large extent focused 
upon whether dissatisfied democrats constitute an asset or a threat to representative democracy. 
Although not frequently empirically tested, most notions have tended to view dissatisfied demo-
crats as an important democratizing force, since they are assumed to be critical, well educated, po-
litically interested and prone to political participation. However, our extensive comparative analysis 
clearly suggests that these speculations are not well grounded in empirical data. In line with the 
results of Doorenspleet (2012) we find only a weak relationship between being a dissatisfied demo-
crat and socio-demographical factors or political variables such as electoral participation, party iden-
tification and political knowledge. Moreover, the data clearly demonstrate that where the relation-
ships are significant they are tilted in favor of the satisfied democrats who in general display higher 
scores on these variables. 
What seems to matter is rather how citizens judge the quality of the input as well as the output side 
of the democratic system. Our statistical analysis shows that the likelihood of being either a satis-
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fied or a dissatisfied democrat is first and foremost determined by people’s assessments of the per-
formance of their government, the perceived extent of political corruption and subjective feelings 
of being represented. The analysis also shows that the quality of government and ideological repre-
sentation on the system level are of minor importance compared to public perceptions. Factors relat-
ing to the input side of democracy, such as subjective representation, do, however, seem to be of 
somewhat greater importance for satisfaction with the way democracy works compared to factors 
related to the output side of the political system, such as assessments of corruption. 
Concerning the impact of institutional consolidation, or democratic maturity, we find that the eval-
uations of government performance are equally important in old and new democracies. However, 
the impact of subjective representation and perceptions of corruption is more pronounced in older 
democracies. A feasible explanation could be that citizens in established democracies with a longer 
experience of political stability and economic growth have greater expectations in terms of general 
performance, both on the input as well as on the output side of the political system. While corrup-
tion and clientelism are more or less part of day-to-day politics in many recent democracies, citizens 
in established democracies with well-developed welfare states expect politicians and public officials 
to behave in a non-corrupt and impartial manner. Thus, when citizens perceive problems of cor-
ruption and public misconduct where it is ‘not supposed’ to be present, it may have a stronger ef-
fect on system support than in settings where such problems with the quality of government are 
more widespread and constitute an integral part of politics.  
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APPENDICES  
 
Individual level variables 
Age of respondent (B2001): coded as: (16/21=1) (22/30=2) (31/40=3) (41/50=4) (51/60=5) 
(61/70=6) (71/max=7) 
Sex (B2002): coded as (Male=1) (Female=2) 
Education (B2003): (Elementary school =1) (High school  (2/3)=2) (Upper Secondary (4/6)=3) 
(University (7/8)=4). Original CSES coding: 1=None, 2 Incomplete primary; 3 Primary com-
pleted; 4=Incomplete secondary; 5=Secondary completed; 6=post-secondary trade/vocational 
school; 7=University undergraduate degree incomplete; 8= University undergraduate degree 
completed.) 
Employment (B2010): (5=0) (1/4=1) (6/12=1) (97/max=.) Original CSES coding: 1= Employed - 
full-time (32+ hours weekly); 2=Employed - part-time (15-32 hours weekly) 3=Employed less 
than 15 hours; 4=Helping family member; 5=Unemployed; 6=Student; 7=Retired; 
8=Housewife/home duties; 9=Permanently disabled, 10=others (not in labor force). 
Party identification (B3028): "Are you close to any political party?" (No=0) (Yes=1) 
Political Knowledge: Additive index based on Political information items 1-3 (B3047_1; B3047_2; 
B3047_3 ) coded as: (Correct=1) (Incorrect=0). 
Voted (B3004_1): "In current election, did respondent cast a ballot?" (Voted=0) (Did not vote=1). 
Voted for governing party (Voted for non-governing party in current election=0) (Voted for party in 
government in current election=1). 
Corruption assessments (B3044): " How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is 
amongst politicians in [country]: very widespread, quite widespread, not very widespread, it 
hardly happens at all?" (Very widespread=1) (Quite widespread=2) (Not very widespread=3) (It 
hardly happens at all=4). 
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Government performance (B3011): "Now thinking about the performance of the government in [capi-
tal]/president in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government/president in 
[capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and the present election 
OR change in government] years. Has it/he/she done a very good job?" (A very good job=1) 
(A good job=2) (A bad job=3) (A very bad job=4). 
Subjective representation (B3022): "Thinking about how elections in [country] work in practice, how 
well do elections ensure that the views of voters are represented by Majority Parties?" (Very 
well=1) (Quite well=2) (Not very well=3) (Not well at all=4). 
System level variables 
QoG-Impartiality measures to what extent government institutions exercise their power impartial. 
The impartiality norm is defined as: “When implementing laws and policies, government officials 
shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in 
the policy or the law.” (Rothstein and Teorell 2008, p. 170). The index is built on five items from 
the Quality of Government expert survey, tapping the impartiality norm. Higher values indicate a 
more impartial public administration. For more detailed information (see Teorell et. al. 2011). 
Ideological congruence is measured as the absolute distances between voters self-placement on an elev-
en point left-right scale and the median placement of the party voted for, made by the approximate-
ly 40 percent most educated respondents in each country. The reason for using the placement of 
parties made by respondents with higher education is that people with lower levels of education 
tend to make less qualified party placements in that they tend to place parties they are unfamiliar 
with in the middle of the left-right scale (see Alvarez & Nagler 2004). The absolute congruence 
measure is constructed as the average absolute distance between the citizens and the position of the 
party voted for, as suggested by Golder and Stramski (2010), where N is the number of citizens and 
Ci is the ideal point of the i:th citizen. 
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For the classification of new and old democracies, see figure 1. 
 30 
The variables for GDP/per capita and GDP growth/per capita (percentage) are taken from the World 
Bank's world development indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog) compiled by: Te-
orell, Jan, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein. 2011. The QoG Standard Dataset 
version 6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se. 
 
